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Abstract
Background: Many studies have highlighted poor understanding of risk and probability in
NHS service users. By contrast, few studies have explored whether health professionals share
similar conceptual diculties. The current study is an attempt to address this issue within the
field of mental health.
Aims: The principal aim of the study is to test knowledge of basic probability across a range
of Mental Health Professionals (MHPs) and to identify those aspects which they found
dicult.
Method: MHPs sample were compared to age-, gender-, and education-matched control
group to establish whether MHPs were more skilled in dealing with probabilistic concepts.
The assessment addressed several key aspects of probability that are important in risk
assessment and evidence-based evaluations.
Results: Contrary to our predictions, the MHP group was no more accurate than the control
group and many conceptual problems were highlighted, ranging from basic arithmetic
diculties to problems in evaluating relevant information. Systematic error was common in
all areas tested. More generally, age, educational level, gender and professional group all
strongly predicted response accuracy.
Conclusions: Our findings are discussed principally in relation to risk assessment practice.
Our data suggest that all MHPs would benefit from receiving greater training in probability
theory, since risk is central to so many concerns in mental health services.
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Introduction
In today’s evidence-based healthcare
culture, probability is an integral part of
treatment-related decision-making. For
example, therapeutic interventions are
now commonly discussed in terms of
odds ratios, relative risks or numbers
needed to treat. Such statistics are
intended to facilitate an informed treat-
ment choice based on an empirically-
derived chance of success or failure.
Over the last decade, concerns have
been raised about whether NHS service
users have sucient grasp of probability
theory to understand and use the infor-
mation they are presented with in med-
ical contexts. Unfortunately, the
literature is rather pessimistic about this
and many conceptual diculties and
cognitive biases have been identified in
patient groups. For example, perception
of risk is modulated by ‘availability bias’
(see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), where-
by there is a tendency to over-estimate
the risk of an outcome that has received
particular notoriety: so, because breast
cancer receives more media attention
than many other forms of cancer, most
women greatly over-estimate their risk of
developing it (see Bogardus et al., 1999).
Understanding of risk is also strongly
influenced by the way in which informa-
tion is framed (Edwards et al., 2001;
Edwards & Elwyn, 2001): thus a pro-
spective patient is more likely to opt for a
treatment if told that it is associated with
a 99% survival rate (positive framing)
rather than a 1% mortality rate (negative
framing), even though the actual risks are
identical. Patients also differ widely in
their understanding of statistical infor-
mation, whether presented numerically
(e.g. Fuller et al., 2001) or by verbal
descriptors such as ‘normal’ (Marteau et
al., 2001), ‘probable’ or ‘certain’ (Biehl et
al., 2001). It is therefore unsurprising
that recent recommendations are for
more graphical decision aids to be used
in the context of treatment evaluation by
doctors and their patients (for a review
see O’Connor et al., 1999).
Conceptual diculties with probability
in a medical context almost certainly
reflect a widespread lack of statistical
knowledge in the general population.
Indeed, one can find parallels for medical
choice dilemmas in everyday life: the
recent reluctance of UK parents to have
their children vaccinated with the MMR
jab because of an equivocal association
with autism suggests that the average
person does not easily conceptualize long
odds (see also Kirkwood, 1994); simi-
larly, this is reflected in the number of
people who participate in the national
lottery despite the near certainty that that
they will not win the jackpot. In contexts
such as these, Dillon & Gill (2001) have
presented the case for a radical re-
appraisal of the national science curricu-
lum to promote greater understanding of
risk and probability.
Assuming then that conceptual bar-
riers to probability and risk are common-
place, one might reasonably ask whether
healthcare professionals also have di-
culties with these issues. However, there
is a dearth of research in this context and
so the implicit assumption that health
professionals are competent in dealing
with concepts of risk may be un-
grounded. With the advent of evidence-
based healthcare, one might optimisti-
cally predict an increasing level of
probabilistic knowledge amongst health-
care professionals. Routine clinical audit
is now an obligatory part of any medical
department’s activity and so most pro-
fessionals ought to have some experience
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with numerical representation of health-
care outcomes. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, many professionals,
and especially those working within a
mental health setting, are now expected
to assess risk as part of normal clinical
duty and this almost certainly entails
some basic understanding of probability.
In these respects then, it would be a
reasonable prediction that mental health
professionals should have a better than
average understanding of probability and
risk.
Turning specifically to risk assessment
in mental health, this is an area which
has been the focus of much recent
attention following changes in service
provision for people with enduring
mental health problems and some highly
publicised cases of homicide committed
by psychiatric patients in the commu-
nity. Indeed, legislation and guidelines
in the mid-1990s in the UK reinforced
the importance of thorough risk assess-
ment and management (DoH, 1994;
1995; HMSO, 1995). Previous studies
on the risk assessment of psychiatric
patients has highlighted inter-profes-
sional variability in the levels of risk
ascribed to specific cases (Montandon &
Harding, 1984; Ryan, 1998). The gender
of the assessor is also known to be a
significant factor in determining whether
ratings are more or less cautious (Ryan,
1998; Gale et al., 2002). Moreover, in a
previous study (Gale et al., 2002) we
demonstrated only moderate (and some-
times worse) levels of inter-rater relia-
bility for risk ratings of mentally ill
patients, suggesting that mental health
professionals (MHPs) may have dicul-
ties both in conceptualizing and expres-
sing risk information. Given that some
probabilistic reasoning must underlie
any given risk assessment (if only in
making a decision about the relative
likelihood of an outcome), it would be
pertinent to assess: (i) whether MHPs
have conceptual diculties with parti-
cular aspects of probability and risk and
(ii) whether this might have implications
for education and training, both in risk




The questionnaire comprised 10 multi-
ple-choice questions and addressed four
broad aspects of simple probability that
were considered relevant to evidence-
based practice and risk assessment: (i)
understanding the concept of random-
ness; (ii) interpretation and simple ma-
nipulation of probabilistic information;
(iii) evaluation of outcomes using basic
probability; and (iv) evaluation of
whether sucient information exists to
make probabilistic inferences. Although
the questionnaire was principally aimed
at healthcare professionals, the use of
clinical scenarios was minimized because:
(i) a control group was also asked to
participate and so we chose scenarios
that would be familiar to all respondents;
(ii) it was important for recruitment and
ethical reasons that participants did not
perceive this to be a vocationally-related
test (it was not). The 10 questions are
presented in Table 1.
The questions varied in diculty to
reduce the likelihood of floor or ceiling
effects. However, no questions were
considered to require specialist know-
ledge beyond that which might reason-
ably be expected of somebody who had
studied O’ level or GCSE maths. The
questionnaire was initially presented to a
group of individuals with experience in
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Table 1: The 10 multiple-choice probability questions. These were presented in a standard
multiple-choice questionnaire format with appropriate spacing and uniformity. A copy of the
original questionnaire is available from the corresponding author on request and a
description of the rationale for each question can be found in the appendix
1. An oil-rig worker is described as having a 2 in a thousand chance of being struck by
lightning. This can also be expressed as: (a) 0.5% chance; (b) 0.2% chance; (c) 0.02%
chance; (d) 0.05% chance.
2. A coin is tossed six times and you record whether it lands as a head or tail each time.
Which of the following do you think is the most likely sequence you would see? (a) H T H T
H T; (b) H H H H H H; (c) T H H T T H; (d) They are all equally likely.
3. Two dice are thrown simultaneously. What is the probability that both will show the
same number when they land? (a) 1 in 6; (b) 1 in 36; (c) 1 in 12; (d) None of these.
4. A cloth bag contains 60 red sweets and 40 blue sweets. If you remove three sweets, one at
a time, without looking at their colour, which is the most likely order of colours that you
will pull out? (a) Red, Red, then Blue; (b) Red, Blue, then Blue; (c) Red, Red, then Red; (d)
It is not possible to say which is most likely.
5. The six winning numbers on last week’s National Lottery were: 9, 11, 22, 38, 44, 45.
Which of the following sequences is most likely to occur this week? (a) 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46;
(b) 9, 11, 22, 38, 44, 45; (c) 2, 17, 21, 29, 33, 48; (d) They are all equally likely.
6. Which of the following statements is most likely to be true? (a) Next week’s National
Lottery jackpot winner will have won the jackpot once before; (b) Next week’s National
Lottery jackpot winner will have a twin brother or sister; (c) Next week’s National Lottery
jackpot winner will not be able to drive; (d) It is not possible to say which is most likely.
7. Four playing cards are chosen at random from a shued pack. Which of the following
scenarios is the most likely outcome? (a) The four chosen cards are all of the same suit; (b)
The 4 chosen cards are all of the same value; (c) The four chosen cards are all pictures (i.e.
J, Q, K or A); (d) It is not possible to say.
8. Two dice are thrown simultaneously. Which of the following is not true? (a) The
probability of throwing two sixes is 1 in 36; (b) The probability of throwing two even
numbers is 1 in 6; (c) The probability of throwing one 5 and one 6 is 1 in 18; (d) The
probability of getting a combined score of 3 or less is 1 in 12.
9. Which of the following is least likely to be true? (a) An asteroid will hit the earth in 1000
years time; (b) The conservatives will be back in power in 1000 years time; (c) No-one will
die from cancer in 1000 years time; (d) It is impossible to say which of these is least likely.
10. The probability of unwanted side-effects after taking a particular vaccine is 1 in 25. A
group of 500 people are given the vaccine. Which one of the following statements do you
think is true? (a) It is possible that no-one will experience side effects; (b) The expected
number of people who will experience side effects is 40; (c) It is impossible that more than
50 people will experience side effects; (d) At least one person in the group will definitely
experience side effects.
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statistics to ensure that there were no
errors or ambiguities. It was then pilot
tested in a sample of 50 non-healthcare
professionals (most of whom were IT
workers) and the accuracy data were
normally distributed around a mean of
50% correct. Chance performance (i.e. if
a respondent guessed every answer)
would be 25%. The rationale for each
question, along with an explanation for




Professionals (MHPs) were recruited on
a voluntary basis from various NHS
mental health units. Anyone who, as
part of their job, undertook some form
of risk assessment was included. The
sample included: consultants (both psy-
chiatrists and psychologists), junior
doctors, CPNs, nurses, social workers,
occupational therapists and managers
(a breakdown of MHPs by general
profession is displayed in Table 2). The
mean age of the group was 41 (+ 10,
range 21 – 67 years) and 58 (39%) were
male. Forty-two (28%) were educated
up to 18 years and 108 (72%) were
educated to degree or postgraduate
level.
One-hundred-and-fifty non-healthcare
professionals were matched to the
MHPs on mean age, education and
gender-mix. This group included,
amongst others, IT workers, oce
staff, civil servants, teachers, solicitors,
employment consultants, skilled man-
ual workers and retired people or
housewives with professional back-
grounds. Scientists and academics were
excluded, as was anyone who worked
in any kind of healthcare setting.
These participants were recruited on
a voluntary basis by friends and
colleagues of the investigative team.
The mean age of the control group
was 41 (+ 13, range 19 – 75) years and
58 (39%) of the sample were male.
Fifty-nine (39%) per cent had been
educated up to age 18 and 91 (61%)
had a higher qualification. The control
group did not differ significantly from
the MHP group on any of these
demographic variables: age (F5 1,
p=0.9); gender mix (X2=0.01,
p=0.9); educational level (X2=3.6,
p4 0.05). Although the difference in
educational level did not reach signifi-
cance between MHPs and controls,
there was a trend towards a higher
level of education in the MHP group.
This was taken into account in the
Table 2: Breakdown of MHPs by profession, gender, age and educational level




Consultant 16 10 6 48 16 (100%)
Junior Doctor 32 15 17 34 32 (100%)
Social Worker 23 7 16 45 17 (74%)
Occupational Therapist 5 0 5 37 5 (100%)
CPN 19 7 12 42 9 (47%)
Nurse 37 14 23 42 21 (57%)
Manager & Other 18 5 13 44 6 (33%)
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between-group comparisons (see re-
sults).
Procedure
Participants were asked to complete
the questionnaire in their own time.
Participation was voluntary and anon-
ymity codes protected the identity of any
respondents. All respondents were asked
to indicate how long it had taken them to
answer the questions. No answers were
given out to any participants until all
data had been collected. Ethical permis-
sion was given for the study by the East




The MHP and control group did not
differ in the number of questions an-
swered correctly, scoring 4.6/10 (+ 1.9,
range 1 – 10) and 4.6/10 (+ 2, range 0 –
10) respectively. Fig. 1 displays the
accuracy levels for both groups and there
was no significant between-groups differ-
ence on any single item (by X2, all
p4 0.05).
Predictors of performance
Across all 300 participants, males did
better than females (mean no. correct
items=5.2 vs. 4.2, F=16.8, p5 0.0001)
and, not surprisingly, those participants
with some form of higher education were
more accurate than those educated to ‘A’
level or below (means 5 vs. 3.7, F=33.8,
p5 0.0001). Age correlated negatively,
though significantly, with total score
(r=70.18, p=0.002). All three predic-
tors were significant when entered into a
multiple regression, together explaining
17% variance in total score (multiple
r=0.41, p5 0.00001).
As noted before, the MHPs and con-
trols were matched across all of these
predictor variables: nonetheless the MHP
group did include a greater number of
individuals with higher qualifications
(108 vs. 91), though this difference did
not reach significance. Given that educa-
tion was such a powerful predictor of
accuracy, the group comparisons, where
re-run firstly for those participants edu-
cated to ‘A’ level or below, and secondly
for those participants with a higher
qualification. There were still no differ-
ences between MHPs and controls
(F5 1, p=0.73; F5 1, p=0.46 respec-
tively).
Within the MHP group alone, profes-
sion was also a strong predictor
(F=3.86, p=0.0007, see Table 3) and
this probably reflects the varied exposure
to probability and statistics associated
with different health professional train-
ing. Indeed, when entered into a multiple
regression using only the MHP scores,
age, educational level, gender and profes-
sion (as classified in Table 2) were all
significant predictors, together explaining
21% variance in total score (multiple
r=0.45, p5 0.00001). The gender dif-
Figure 1: Items analysis for MHPs and
controls
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ference in the MHP group was almost
identical to that found in the control
group (M :F 5.2 vs. 4.2; M :F 5.2 vs. 4.3
respectively).
There was no correlation between the
amount of time taken to complete the
questionnaire and the level of response
accuracy achieved by MHPs (r=0.05,
F5 1, p=0.6). However, a small though
significant relationship was observed for
control participants (r=0.25, F=7.3,
p=0.008). This discrepancy is all the
more interesting given that, on average,
control participants took less time to
complete the questionnaire (Mean
8.6 min+ 3.8, range 3 – 20) than MHPs
(Mean 10.3 min+ 5.3, range 1 – 30) and
this between-groups difference reached
statistical significance (F=7.5,
p=0.007). In short, MHPs did not seem
to benefit from thinking longer about
each question, suggesting that if they did
not already know the answer they were
unlikely to work it out.
Item analysis
The MHP responses for each item were
investigated for evidence of systematic
error. A systematic error would be
indicated where the distribution of erro-
neous responses for an item was highly
uneven (i.e. where a modal incorrect
response could be clearly identified). So,
for example, if 60 MHPs answered one
question incorrectly, and 52 of these all
opted for the same incorrect answer, the
pattern of error would be systematic
rather than random. All but one item
elicited systematic errors (Table 4).
The individual items can be arranged
into four groups based upon the perfor-
mance accuracy of the MHP respon-
dents: 1 Highly accurate (4 75%
correct), 2 Moderately accurate (51 –
75% correct), 3 Inaccurate but still above
chance (25 – 50% correct) and 4 Inaccu-
rate below chance (5 25%).
1. Highly accurate
Two items (#2 and #5, which both
related to prediction of random distribu-
tions) were correctly answered by the
majority of respondents (87% and 92%
respectively). As would be expected,
given the thematic link between these
items, there was a high level of response
consistency: 83% respondents got both
correct, 4% got both wrong and 13% got
only one right. The slightly better per-
formance on question 5 may reflect
greater familiarity of chance within the
context of lottery outcomes. Those peo-
ple who did make errors on these items
Table 3: Inter-professional differences in response accuracy for MHPs




Consultant 16 6.25 (+ 2.5) 3 – 10
Junior Doctor 32 5.13 (+ 2.1) 1 – 9
Social Worker 23 4.60 (+ 1.6) 2 – 8
OT 5 4.60 (+ 0.9) 4 – 6
CPN 19 3.95 (+ 1.6) 2 – 8
Nurse 37 3.84 (+ 1.5) 1 – 8
Manager 11 4.64 (+ 1.9) 2 – 9
Other 7 3.86 (+ 1.3) 2 – 6
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tended to choose the answers that
‘looked’ most random (i.e. A or C on
item #2, and C on item #5).
2. Moderately accurate
Three items (#1, #9 and #10) generated
correct responses in more than half but
less than three-quarters of the respon-
dents (53%, 70% and 56% respectively).
There was no particular thematic link
between these items and response con-
sistency was weak (34% were correct on
all 3, 3% were incorrect on all 3 and 63%
were correct on some). The majority of
people who were incorrect for item No. 1,
chose answer C (0.02% instead of 0.2%)
suggesting an arithmetical diculty in
dealing with small numbers. This finding
is important because many medical out-
comes (e.g. risks of some side effects),
have low probability of occurring and the
implication here is that some health
professionals may have diculty concep-
tualising or expressing these odds (it is of
particular concern that 34% junior doc-
tors and 19% consultants were incorrect
on this item). For item No. 9, the
distribution of erroneous responses was
almost random suggesting that those
MHPs who did not know the answer
responded with a pure guess. For item
#10, however, most incorrect responders
chose answer D suggesting a systematic
conceptual error with regard to verbal
descriptors of probability.
3. Inaccurate but above chance
Item #8 was answered incorrectly by
approximately 69% of responders.
Although the distribution of errors was
more even than for most other items, it
did deviate from chance (p=0.02). In
one respect, this was arguably the most
dicult question because it necessitated
multiple probability calculations before
an answer could be reached. It is
surprising then that other, apparently
less dicult, questions were answered
with sub-chance levels of accuracy (see 4
below).
4. Inaccurate below chance
Items No. 3, No. 4, No. 6, No. 7 all
elicited levels of response accuracy worse
than that predicted by chance (i.e. pure
Table 4: The distribution of MHP responses for each question: correct answers are indicated
by bold typeface. The distribution of erroneous responses for each question was compared to
chance distribution using w2. Significant results (at p5 0.05) indicate evidence for systematic
error. The column ‘NR’ indicates the number of non-responses (i.e. failures to indicate any
answer at all).
Item A B C D NR Systematic
Error
No. 1 6 (4.1%) 78 (53.1%) 50 (34%) 13 (8.8%) 3 Yes
No. 2 10 (6.7%) 0 (0%) 9 (6%) 131 (87.3%) 0 Yes
No. 3 36 (24.5%) 60 (40.8%) 22 (15.0%) 29 (19.7%) 3 Yes
No. 4 19 (12.8%) 6 (4.0%) 24 (16.1%) 100 (67.1%) 1 Yes
No. 5 0 (0%) 1 (0.7%) 11 (7.3%) 138 (92%) 0 Yes
No. 6 1 (0.7%) 3 (2%) 25 (16.9%) 119 (80.4%) 2 Yes
No. 7 17 (11.4%) 3 (2%) 26 (17.5%) 103 (69.1%) 1 Yes
No. 8 23 (16.8%) 43 (31.4%) 29 (21.2%) 42 (30.6%) 13 Yes
No. 9 12 (8.2%) 14 (9.5%) 18 (12.2%) 103 (70.1%) 3 No
No. 10 83 (56.1%) 10 (6.7%) 8 (5.4%) 47 (31.8%) 2 Yes
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guessing by all respondents would, in
theory, give an overall accuracy level
higher than was observed here), again
suggesting widespread systematic error.
For example, on item No. 3, the most
popular response by far (at 43%) was
answer B (1 in 36), indicating that many
people thought this particular outcome
was 6 times less likely than was actually
the case. Moreover, for items No. 4, No.
6, and No. 7, the most popular response
was answer D – ‘it is not possible to say’
(63, 77, 66% respectively) suggesting that
some respondents equated being unable
to answer the question with the question
being impossible to answer. Indeed, for
items #6 and #7, more people chose the
‘it is impossible to say’ option than for
item #9 (which was the only question
where it really was not possible to give a
precise answer!). There was no strong
thematic link between the items that
elicited worse than chance performance
suggesting that MHPs have diculties
with a whole range of different issues
surrounding probability theory. Consis-
tency for the sub-chance items was
moderately high, simply because so many
people performed poorly (only 3% were
correct on all 4, 58% were incorrect on
all 4 and 39% were incorrect on some).
Discussion
This was a very simple study which
tested MHPs’ ability to deal with some
basic concepts in probability and arith-
metic. Nonetheless, the data address
some important issues.
Overall accuracy across the question-
naire was 46% or, expressed another
way, MHPs answered more questions
incorrectly than correctly. Of course,
percentage accuracy scores reflect an
overall level of task diculty, though
we did use questions that (i) were non-
technical, (ii) did not probe advanced
statistical concepts and (iii) were set at a
level such that a person numerate to ‘O’
level or GCSE standard might reason-
ably expect to know the answers, and are
not absolute measures of aptitude for
solving these kinds of problems. None-
theless, as relative measures, they do
provide some useful indications. For
example, MHPs performed identically
to a matched control group, indicating
that they do not have a marked defi-
ciency in probability skills (although our
initial prediction was that they should be
more accurate). Similarly, percentage
accuracy scores distinguished between
(i) different mental health professions
and (ii) genders. This may, of course,
reflect prior training and educational
experiences of these sub-groups: for
example, that a robust gender effect was
observed in both MHP and control
groups suggests a common explanation
and this is most likely that females are
under-represented in groups of people
with higher mathematical and scientific
qualifications.
Analysis of the individual items in our
questionnaire suggests that, aside from
knowledge of random distributions
which was generally quite good (e.g.
No. 2, No. 5), MHPs had conceptual
diculties with all other aspects of
probability tested here. These ranged
from (i) simple manipulation of prob-
abilistic information (e.g. No. 1) through
(ii) appraisal of relative likelihood using
information presented within the ques-
tion (e.g. No. 4, No. 10) to (iii) appraisal
of relative likelihood using information
unavailable in the question (e.g. No. 6,
No. 9). Few of the questions here
actually required the respondent to com-
pute actual probabilities for each possible
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outcome: indeed, for several questions
(e.g. No. 4, No. 7) it was possible to
make a correct choice simply by counting
set sizes (see appendix for explanations).
However, it is noteworthy that such
examples fell within the questions that
were answered at a sub-chance level of
accuracy: this suggests that respondents
did not adopt or look for simple strate-
gies but, rather, preferred the assumption
that an answer could not be given. This
was also true of the control group so,
once again, the MHPs have not indicated
abnormally poor conceptual skills in this
respect.
However, one important difference
between the control group and MHPs is
the expectation that the latter should be
skilled in handling concepts of risk.
Indeed, the general premise of risk assess-
ment in mental health is that the profes-
sional has access to data which (i) enables
the chance of various outcomes to be
considered and (ii) depending on the
perceived likelihood and severity of the
outcomes, can be used to support changes
in care management. However, such a
premise assumes the professional to be a
rational actor, considering data in relation
to a patient, and not making errors in the
manipulation of that data. The current
study demonstrates that MHPs are far
from error-free in handling some funda-
mental concepts in probability. No matter
how good the data input (e.g. patient
characteristics, previous medication his-
tory, etc.) are, a clinical risk assessment
process can have no meaningful output if
the conceptual processes underlying deci-
sion making are flawed. On the one hand,
it may be argued that simple probability
dilemmas (e.g. coin-tossing experiments)
do not characterize the type of scenarios
that are considered by a MHP under-
taking a risk assessment. On the other
hand, if an individual is unable to make
relative (let alone absolute) predictions
when provided with the relevant informa-
tion for a single-parameter choice-dilem-
ma, how can the same individual be
expected to make accurate assessments
in the real-world, where multiple para-
meters must be taken into account? A
good example here is item No. 3 in our
questionnaire: the number of MHPs who
answered this question correctly was few-
er than chance would predict, with the
clear majority thinking that the outcome
was six times less likely than it really was;
here is a simple case of looking at two
independent events (both of which have
the same parameters) and calculating the
odds of both events occurring. A clinical
analogue of this is that a patient risk
assessment may need to take into con-
sideration many parameters, some of
which are inter-dependent and some of
which are independent: if aMHP does not
know how to weight the data accordingly,
this may lead to considerable over- or
under-estimation of risk. This also leads
on to a very important aspect of prob-
ability that we did not assess in our study:
namely, conditional probability. Condi-
tional probability is the likelihood of one
event occurring given that another event
has already occurred (i.e. where the two
events are not independent) and this is
perhaps more representative of the typical
risk scenarios that a clinicianmay be faced
with. However, the point here is that
calculation of conditional probabilities
(e.g. by using Bayes’ Theorem) is con-
siderably more complex than the simple
probability calculations required in our
questionnaire. Thus, we would predict
that MHP understanding of conditional
probability (and hence real-world risk
assessment) will be even weaker than
indicated by our questionnaire.
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Some might argue that formal con-
cepts of probability theory have little to
do with real-world clinical risk assess-
ment, and that the latter relies on
intuitive and qualitative procedures.
That intuition may serve some useful
purpose in risk assessment is not some-
thing we would directly contest. How-
ever, risk is by definition about the
statistical likelihood of potential out-
comes, for example 1 in 10, 1 in 1000,
and so on. We would argue that verbal
descriptors which reflect an intuitive,
qualitative assessment process (for ex-
ample, ‘high’, ‘moderate’ or ‘low-risk’)
simply blur the risk outcome and convey
minimal information for directing future
action. Moreover, evidence-based assess-
ments of risk for given outcomes are
often available from epidemiological
data and so an individual assessment
should increase, not decrease, the preci-
sion of any such prediction. For exam-
ple, if we know the computed risk of
suicide in a given population, this figure
should arguably form the basis of any
individual risk assessment within the
same population. This is simply because
a population mean will always be the
best predictor under uncertainty. This is
not to say that further individual risk
assessment is unwarranted but, rather,
that any additional information is con-
sidered in conjunction with pre-existing
evidence. In short, to describe an
individual as being at ‘low’ risk of
suicide would be a meaningless state-
ment.
Although MHPs may not be currently
trained to think about risk in terms of
probability, this is not to say that real-
world clinical risk assessment has noth-
ing to do with probability. The fact that
most risk assessments in mental health
do not currently use a formal probabil-
istic language is not an argument for the
validity of risk assessment as intuitive
and qualitative but, rather, an observa-
tion of the inadequate empirical basis for
risk assessment. One concrete recommen-
dation arising from this paper concerns
training. This would provide an oppor-
tunity to educate staff in the basics of
probability theory, at least periodically.
Whether it will be at all acceptable for
healthcare professionals to ‘go back to
school’ to learn some maths is an
interesting question.
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Appendix
The rationale behind each question
and an explanation of the correct an-
swers follow:
Question 1 simply assesses the ability
of respondents to convert probabilistic
information from one medium to an-
other. This would have some parallels in
the interpretation of epidemiological
data. The correct answer is B, since 2
divided by 1000, and then multiplied by
100, is 0.2.
Question 2 tests knowledge of random
distributions. It is well known that
individuals ascribe too much weight to
small samples, expecting them to produce
stable patterns that are representative of
the population of possible outcomes (e.g.
Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). In these
kinds of scenarios this may result in a
bias towards belief that random events
should not occur in sequences that
appear ‘orderly’ even though this is in
fact untrue. The correct answer is D since
each of these exact outcomes is equally
likely.
Question 3 tests whether individuals
are able to work out the exact probability
of two thrown dice showing the same
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number. To do this, it is necessary to
calculate the number of outcomes where
this is true (n=6) as a proportion of the
total number of possible outcomes
(n=36). Thus, the correct answer is A.
Another way of thinking about this
problem is that it does not really matter
what number the first die reads, but there
is a one in six chance that the second will
read the same number. Essentially, this
problem can be solved by counting.
Question 4 tests whether the respon-
dent can use the information given to
predict the most likely result. Given that
there are 20 more red than blue sweets, it
is always more likely that a red sweet will
be drawn on each of the three occasions.
The probability of this happening can be
calculated as 0.212 which is higher than
any of the other possibilities given. Thus
the correct answer is C. However,
although it is possible to calculate exact
probability of each outcome, this is not
actually necessary because one only
needs to take account of the relative
counts of each colour to make a judge-
ment.
Question 5 is similar to question 2
except that the range of possible out-
comes is much greater. Folk psychology
may suggest that the same lottery num-
bers will not come up two weeks running
but in fact, last week’s sequence is just as
likely to come up as any other sequence.
The correct answer is D.
Question 6 does not provide and
direct statistical information but it is
still possible to rank the options in order
of least to most likely by considering the
relative frequencies of each type of
person in the population of possible
lottery participants. There are many
more people who cannot drive than
people with twin siblings (The 1999/
2001 UK travel survey estimates that
29% of the population aged over 17 do
not hold any form of driving license
[DoT, 2001] and national birth statistics
indicate that only 1 – 2% of births are
multiple). The number of people who
have won the lottery jackpot before
would be the smallest group, being less
than 0.01% of the eligible population.
Thus, the most likely of the given
options is C. Even though it is very
unlikely that people would know the
specific probabilities associated with
each option, they ought to be able to
work out which one is most likely. This
question therefore assesses whether in-
dividuals can recognise that an assess-
ment of likelihood can sometimes be
made using relative rather than absolute
probabilistic information and has paral-
lels in risk assessment (where absolute
risks may be unknown).
Question 7 tests whether an individual
can use frequency information to decide
which outcome is most likely. In a pack
of cards, the number belonging to any
one suit is 13, the number which have the
same value is four and the number of
picture cards (J, Q, K and A) is 16. Thus,
it is more likely that four cards chosen at
random will be picture cards (C) because
this is the largest set. As with question 4,
it is possible to prove this is true using the
multiplication rule, but this is not neces-
sary to answer the question correctly.
To answer question 8 correctly, one
can either use multiplication and addi-
tion rules, or one could calculate the
proportion of outcomes that would fulfil
each event as a proportion of the total
number of possible outcomes. The prob-
ability of throwing two sixes is one sixth
squared (1 in 36), the probability of
throwing two even numbers is one-half
squared (one in four), the probability of
throwing one 5 and one 6 is one-sixth
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squared multiplied by two (one in 18)
and the probability of a combined score
of three or less is one-sixth squared
multiplied by three (one in 12). Thus,
the correct answer (i.e. the statement that
is false) is B.
Question 9 presents three options that
may or may not be true in 1000 years
time. Although it is sometimes possible
to rank events from the least to most
likely (i.e. more or less probable) even
when the absolute odds are not available
(for example, see Question 6), this does
not hold for question 9 because it is very
unlikely that any current information or
intuition will hold constant over such a
long time period (e.g. consider the
differences in politics, medicine and
astronomy between 1000AD and
2000AD: can we be sure that the
conservative party will even exist in
1000 years time? Do we know whether
a small, and as yet, undetected asteroid
may collide with the earth at the third
millenium? Can we be sure that abso-
lutely no-one, anywhere on the planet,
will die of cancer?). Thus the correct
answer is D. This question tests whether
individuals are able to recognise when it
is not possible to make an assessment
because the necessary information is
lacking.
Question 10 tests whether individuals
can evaluate each possible outcome using
the given information. If the risk of side
effects is 1 in 25, the expected number of
people experiencing these effects will be
20 (i.e. 500 multiplied by 1/25). Thus
option B is incorrect. Although it may be
unlikely that more than 50 people will
experience side effects, it is certainly
possible. Thus C can also be discounted
as false. Although it is likely that at least
one person in the group will experience
side effects, this is not a certainty and so
D is false also. Thus the correct answer is
A, even though it seems rather unlikely
that no-one will experience side effects.
This question also tests the respondents’
understanding of verbal probability de-
scriptors (see Biehl & Halpern-Felsher,
2001).
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